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Abstract 
This paper focuses on China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative and investments in commercial 
ports in Europe so as to explain why China is investing in these ports, to what extent the 
investments are dictated by security issues, attempts to gain political influence in the host 
countries or economic, above all commercial considerations and, finally, whether the 
findings have implications for the EU’s and the member states’ response. The analysis is 
based on a comparative case study of Chinese investments in the ports of Piraeus and 
Rotterdam using Robert Blackwill’s and Jennifer Harris’ geoeconomic analytical framework. 
The research shows that China’s objectives vary depending on the individual circumstances 
and characteristics of the host country and the port; political and economic in Piraeus but 
economic and commercial in Rotterdam. However, a more comprehensive understanding of 
China’s Maritime Silk Road strategy in Europe requires further research including a wider 
range of variables and actors.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the financial crisis in 2008 China’s foreign direct investments (FDI) into EU has increased 
substantially, amounting to total FDI stock of approximately €132bn by the end of 2017 
(MERICS, 2018, p17). A large part of these investments has been directed at infrastructure 
projects and by the end of 2017 Chinese companies owned more than 10% of EU’s port 
capacity. The launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 and particularly the extension 
of the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) into European waters accelerated China’s 
investments in commercial port facilities in EU member states, from Greece in the Eastern 
Mediterranean to ports around the English Channel, the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. 
 
In his book “On China” Henry Kissinger writes that “It [China] does not view the prospect of a 
strong China exercising influence in economic, cultural, political, and military affairs as an 
unnatural challenge to world order but rather as a return to a normal state of affairs” 
(Kissinger, 2012, p546). However, China’s growing investments in EU, particularly the broader 
political and security aspects of these investments are causing anxiety. The discussions have 
focused on how best to respond to the extension of BRI and MSRI into Europe. EU member 
states are on the one hand competing to attract Chinese investments and on the other 
discussing whether to introduce regulations of and restrictions on Chinese investments, 
nationally or EU wide. However, neither the political discussions nor, to any wider extent, the 
academic literature has attempted to analyse, why China is pursuing BRI and MSRI into 
Europe, i. e. the determinants behind these investments, and when they do, they focus mainly 
on general political and macroeconomic concerns. The vast majority of these studies are 
based on realist and geopolitical theories, focusing on issues related to security and political 
influence and applied primarily to the relationship between the US and China, while economic 
and particularly commercial aspects of China’s foreign policy initiatives have been less 
prominent.  
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The focus of this dissertation is on China’s investments in commercial ports in the EU with a 
view to explain why China is investing in ports in Europe. The analysis is based on a 
comparative case study of Chinese investments in two commercial ports, the Port of Piraeus 
in Greece and the Port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands. Based on the analytical framework 
presented by Blackwill and Harris in “War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft” 
(Blackwill & Harris, 2017) this dissertation questions whether China’s investments in the two 
ports are dictated by security issues, attempts to gain political influence or economic, above 
all commercial considerations? Do the answers have implications for how the EU and the 
member states have responded or ought to respond to BRI/MSRI? If some Chinese 
investments are best explained by economic and, particularly, commercial interests while 
others by political considerations, EU’s future relationship with China ought to reflect this 
complexity.     
 
This dissertation continues as follows: the second section discusses the theories, realism and 
geopolitics, widely used as the basis for analysing China’s current security and foreign policy, 
including BRI, and then focusses on geoeconomics as an applicable framework for the purpose 
of analysing this dissertation’s research questions; the third section introduces the research 
questions, strategy and methodology; the fourth section presents the case studies, which 
provide the empirical basis for analysing China’s port investments in Europe; the fifth section 
analyses the findings and applies the results to the research questions; the sixth section 
concludes. 
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2. Literature Review  
 
Stephen M. Walt wrote in 1998 in “International Relations: One World, Many Theories” that 
“we need theories to make sense of the blizzard of information that bombard us daily” and  
went on to demonstrate how the main international relations theories help to frame the 
debate about how to respond to China, with realism claiming that “China’s ascent is the latest 
example of the tendency for rising powers to alter the global balance of power in potentially 
dangerous ways, especially as their growing influence makes them more ambitious” (Walt, 
1998, pp29-30). Most academic literature analysing contemporary Chinese foreign policy is 
based on realist and geopolitical theories, focusing primarily on security and political 
influence, while the economic aspects, the main focus of geoeconomics and economic 
statecraft, are ignored or side-lined. 
 
2.1. Realism 
Realism regards the state as the principal actor and its duty in an anarchic and conflictual 
world is to protect the national interests. Power maximisation is the ultimate goal in the zero-
sum game, while economic policy is subordinated political objectives, inevitably leading 
realists to focus on security and political aspects of Chinese foreign policy, including BRI.  
 
John Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realism expresses this clearly: “the basic structure of the 
international system forces states concerned with their security to compete with each other 
for power and the ultimate goal for every great power is to maximise its share of world power 
and eventually dominate the system, i.e. the most powerful states seek to establish 
hegemony in their region of the world while also ensuring that no rival great power dominates 
another area” (Mearsheimer, 2014, pp363-365). Hence, China will not rise peacefully but 
attempt to become the regional hegemon in Asia and try to weaken the US’ established 
positions in the Western Hemisphere. Due to its sheer size, economic power and its expanding 
blue-water navy China aims to control its vital sea lines of communication and project its 
power worldwide. Growing nationalism, particularly under Xi Jinping’s leadership, supports 
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an overtly aggressive foreign policy resulting in China’s neighbours joining balancing coalitions 
in support of the US’ containment strategy which will, eventually, lead to preventive war 
(Mearsheimer, 2014, pp379-383). Attempts to constrain China’s economic growth will have 
serious consequences but are necessary as survival “is a more powerful imperative than 
prosperity” (Mearsheimer, 2014, p391). Michael Mandelbaum in “Mission Failure”, shares 
Mearsheimer’s view that China’s growing economic success must translate into a wish for 
greater military power. However, contrary to most realists he acknowledges that military 
power, particularly its blue-water navy, also serves to protect China’s transoceanic 
commerce, supply of essential raw materials and export of manufactured goods 
(Mandelbaum, 2016, pp345 & 349).  
 
Many realist scholars adhere to the thesis that China’s rise as a super power is likely to end in 
war with the US and Graham Allison’s “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed 
for War?” summarises this view (Allison, 2015). Allison refers to the Greek historian 
Thucydides’ analysis of the Peloponnesian war between Athens and Sparta in the 5th century 
B.C., which concludes that when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power war is 
inevitable due to “the rising power’s growing entitlement, sense of its importance, and 
demand for greater say and sway, on the one hand, and the fear, insecurity, and 
determination to defend the status quo this engenders in the established power, on the 
other” (Allison, 2015). However, a case study covering 16 conflicts over the past 500 years 
shows only 12 resulted in war, and Allison therefore concludes that war between the US and 
China is not inevitable but the situation needs careful managing. Two Chinese American 
scholars have questioned the use of Thucydides’ analysis, pointing out it is based almost 
exclusively on European examples. An analysis of East Asian historic cases leads to a different 
conclusion: power vacuums are often as dangerous as power transitions and a hegemon’s 
internal decline is often more damaging than external challengers (Kang & Ma, 2018, pp138 
& 151).   
 
Despite being regarded as a realist scholar, Henry Kissinger has a more nuanced view of 
Chinese foreign policy and he does not regard war between China and the US as inevitable. 
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Based on an analysis of the events preceding the outbreak of the 1st World War, Kissinger 
instead concludes “relations between China and the United States need not – and should not 
– become a zero-sum game”, China and the US can develop a relationship which is less a 
partnership and more a “co-evolution” (Kissinger, 2012, pp523-526). The subsequent 
paperback edition includes a more pessimistic “Afterword”, stressing that the formation of 
two exclusionary blocs in East and West “will replicate on a global scale the zero-sum 
calculations that produced the twentieth century conflagrations in Europe”, only if China and 
the US can create an “agreed world order” is a win-win result realistic (Kissinger, 2012, p543). 
In a recent interview in Financial Times, Kissinger concludes a divided Atlantic would turn 
Europe into “an appendage to Eurasia” at the mercy of China, which wants to restore its 
historic role as the Middle Kingdom and be “the principal advisor to all humanity” (Financial 
Times, 2018). 
 
2.2. Geopolitics 
Geopolitics in its modern, 21st century form is closely related to realism and currently a much 
(mis)used term for wide aspects of international politics. However, the term geopolitics 
(geopolitik) was first used by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen in 1899 and recently 
defined by Daniel Deudney as the “analysis of the geographic influences on power 
relationships in international relations” (Deudney, 2018).  
 
Two early geopolitical thinkers, the American admiral Alfred Mahan and the British 
geographer Sir Halford Mackinder focused on sea power and territorial power respectively. 
In “The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783” Mahan argued that control of the 
sea commons and particularly the so-called key choke-points (vital narrow straits and canals) 
meant control of shipping and trade thereby enabling major maritime states (seaboard 
nations) to secure their commercial prosperity and defence and, ultimately, achieve global 
dominance (Mahan,1890). Mackinder focused on territorial power, claiming that the state 
which controls a network of railways across Inner Eurasia, the Heartland, controls the World 
Island (Europe, Asia and Africa) and ultimately the world (Mackinder, 1904). More than one 
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hundred years later these ideas seem to apply to China’s BRI strategy and have indeed been 
used widely to explain Chinese foreign policy in the 21st century. 
 
Robert D Kaplan’s influential article “The Revenge of Geography” reverts to Mackinder’s ideas 
about the Eurasian Heartland and World Island, claiming that geopolitics can explain China’s 
attempts to acquire political and economic influence regionally and in the countries around 
the Indian Ocean (Kaplan, 2009). In “The Geography of Chinese Power, How Far Can Beijing 
Reach on Land and on Sea?” Kaplan reiterates that China’s advantageous geographical 
position in Eurasia must not be overlooked when discussing its political assertiveness and 
economic dynamism, its quest for raw materials, secure sea transport and ports. Like realists, 
Kaplan focuses on security and the US’ response to the Chinese navy’s projection of hard 
power, but he also refers to China’s real economic reasons for protecting its lines of 
communication at sea, particularly in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific (Kaplan, 2010, pp37-
38). This view is developed further in “The Return of Marco Polo’s World”, in which Kaplan 
compares BRI with Marco Polo’s travels in the 13th century and explains how Europe’s 
existence is under threat from the interaction of globalisation, technology, connectivity and 
geopolitics as Eurasia is turning into a supercontinent, a fluid, comprehensive unit of trade 
and conflict, dominated by China and, to a lesser degree, Russia. However, the US’ future 
strategic relationship with the new supercontinent and the danger of war remain his main 
focus. While “geopolitics is the struggle of states against the backdrop of geography” Kaplan 
acknowledges the effect of domestic factors on foreign policy and international relations and 
concludes China’s future dominance of the Eurasian supercontinent is not inevitable (Kaplan, 
2018, pp7-10, 35-38, 235 & 260). 
 
Chinese scholars have also used geopolitics to explain China’s foreign policy strategy this 
century. Zhang Wenmu’s “Sea Power and China’s Strategic Choices” stresses that China’s 
“national goals have shifted from the need to guarantee its survival” towards sustaining its 
economic growth based on a strong navy which can secure international sea lanes, 
guaranteeing its supply of resources and its export. China has a right and a need to protect its 
interests in the global system but must remain a regional power concentrating on Asia, not 
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succumb to the temptation of excessive expansion (Zhang, 2006, pp17, 20, 25 & 27). A view 
not supported by Christopher Hughes, who in “Reclassifying Chinese Nationalism: the 
geopolitik turn” has analysed a number of Chinese literary and scholarly texts, including 
Zhang’s. Hughes concludes that China’s current foreign policy is heavily influenced by so-
called “geopolitik nationalism”, a mix of Chinese nationalism and geopolitical thinking, which 
calls for China’s economic, political and cultural development to be accompanied by 
expansion of its security perimeter. China’s interpretation of “geopolitik nationalism” 
ultimately rests on the assumption that growing global interests require projection of global 
power as reflected in its post-2008 zero-sum approach to foreign and security policy (Hughes, 
2011, pp605, 614-15 & 617-18). 
 
In “Westward ho – the China dream and “one belt, one road”: Chinese foreign policy under 
Xi Jinping” Peter Ferdinand agrees that Xi Jinping’s foreign policy strategy is based on making 
China “strong and powerful” again through active and ambitious initiatives, rebalancing 
China’s relationship with the US from a military to an economic, diverting attention from the 
Pacific towards Eurasia, Africa, the Middle East and Europe, and converting China from an 
Asian to a global power. Ferdinand lists Xi’s reasons for pursuing BRI, economic, 
business/commercial and geopolitical, an attempt to improve China’s transport and trade 
relations with Europe and, maybe, make Europe more dependent on China than on the US. 
Ferdinand concludes that BRI “marks a new stage in the growing salience of geopolitical 
considerations in Chinese foreign policy” (Ferdinand, 2016, pp951-53 & 955-56).  
 
Jean-Mark Blanchard’s and Colin Flint’s “The Geopolitics of China’s Maritime Silk Road 
Initiative” refers to MSRI as a geopolitical project, “a political-economic project with territorial 
consequences” (Blanchard & Flint, 2017, p238). Descriptions of MSRI vary from a win-win, 
benevolent economic development initiative to a zero-sum political step towards inevitable 
confrontation with the US over dominance of the Asia Pacific region and, ultimately, global 
hegemony The former view is predominantly based on economic variables and goals and in 
line with the official Chinese narrative, while the latter reflects realist or geopolitical ideas.  
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While acknowledging BRI is a major component in China’s current foreign policy strategy, 
realism and geopolitics focus on political and security issues as the primary determinants 
behind China’s actual policy. The political and military relationship between the US and China 
remains the main point of interest, a zero-sum game which may end in war. Some geopolitical 
scholars like Blanchard, Flint and Ferdinand do acknowledge the official Chinese presentation 
of BRI as essentially a benevolent, economic initiative but their conclusions reflect the realist 
zero-sum worldview. The same applies to some Chinese scholars as mentioned by Hughes. 
BRI’s real and potential influence in Europe is only referred to briefly and no efforts are made 
to analyse whether BRI, despite being presented as one initiative, might be many, separate 
projects. Geopolitics, even realism, might provide the best framework for analysing the Sino-
American relationship and China’s strategy in the South and East China Seas. However, 
neither explains China’s investments in commercial ports in Europe nor state-owned 
companies’ role in the implementation of BRI/MSRI. Issues which are more comprehensively 
covered by geoeconomics.   
 
2.3. Geoeconomics and Economic Statecraft 
Geoeconomics and economic statecraft, as developed since the end of the Cold War is 
understood as the interplay between geopolitics and international economics, where 
economic tools are used to advance geopolitical objectives or reversed, geopolitical tools 
used for economic purposes. The widespread use of economic sanctions in international 
politics and Russia’s interruption of energy supplies are resent examples but geoeconomics 
also apply to contemporary Chinese foreign policy strategy, particularly BRI. Some scholars 
have even dismissed “classical” geopolitics as out of date and outright dangerous. Paul 
Richardson in “”Blue national soil” and the unwelcome return of “classical” geopolitics” claims 
geopolitics does not explain modern China’s foreign policy, its motivations and 
preoccupations. It does not take into account shared political and economic interests, the 
existence and membership of international institutions and the fact that both the US and 
China are nuclear powers. He concludes that geopolitical ideas “work to intensify Chinese 
fears of containment, at the same time as they expose the prevailing fractures, anxieties, and 
insecurities of the globalist regime” (Richardson, 2015, pp234 & 236). 
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At the end of the Cold War Edward Luttwak was one of the first to argue that military power 
has been replaced by geoeconomic power, not geopolitics but an “admixture of the logic of 
conflict with the methods of commerce … or the logic of war in the grammar of commerce”, 
where states use economic regulations as tools of statecraft but the logic of zero-sum still 
prevails (Luttwak, 1990, p19). Luttwak still adhered to realist theory about the role of the 
state and its raison d’etre, but war as the ultimate solution was replaced by economic 
measures. Subsequently, in “Why China Will Not Become the Next Global Power … But It 
Could” Luttwak argued that due to the US’ military strength and its alliances it is not in China’s 
best interest to use its fast-growing military power in pursuit of global power but instead use 
its economic power and rely on diplomatic solutions (Luttwak, 2011, p10).  
 
However, economic statecraft has been practised intermittently throughout history and 
David Baldwin defined it in his 1985 book “Economic Statecraft” and again in Encyclopaedia 
Britannica in 2016, as “the use of economic means to pursue foreign policy goals”, applying 
tools such as “foreign aid, trade, and policies governing international flow of capital” which 
can take different forms, positive as well as negative (Baldwin, 2016). 
 
James Reilly uses a similar definition in his analysis “China’s Economic Statecraft: Turning 
Wealth into Power”, claiming “Beijing is deploying its vast economic wealth to advance 
foreign policy goals … using economic statecraft more frequently, more assertively, and in 
more diverse fashion than ever before” (Reilly, 2013, p1). Focusing on how and how 
effectively China uses economic statecraft, Reilly concludes that while China has exceptional 
advantages such as size, economic wealth and a centrally controlled economy there are limits 
to its success, as economic tools can generate unforeseen backlashes. The cost to the 
domestic economy may be prohibitive and the government cannot always control its 
domestic actors, resulting in an incoherent and contradictory strategy. Also, China’s foreign 
economic ventures may not always be part of their foreign policy strategy but may serve 
commercial and trade purposes (Reilly, 2013, pp11-13).        
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In “War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft” Blackwill and Harris define 
geoeconomics as “the use of economic instruments to promote and defend national interests 
and to produce beneficial geopolitical results; and the effect of other nations’ economic 
actions on a country’s geopolitical goals”, calling it a method of analysis and a technique of 
statecraft “providing a parallel account of how a state builds and exercises power by reference 
to economic factors rather than geographic ones”. Geoeconomics can be a zero-sum as well 
as a positive-sum game (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, pp20-24). Like Reilly, but contrary to 
Luttwak, Blackwill and Harris stress that geoeconomic tools can be used to pursue geopolitical 
objectives while simultaneously have economic goals. Also geoeconomics is different from 
foreign economic police, mercantilism and liberal economic ideas. The former is 
“governmental actions intended to influence the international economic environment” while 
the others are described as “shades of geoeconomics”, dependent upon whether a particular 
economic policy is pursued to “promote foreign policy goals of the state” or not (Blackwill & 
Harris, 2017, pp26-27, 30 & 32). Governments have a range of economic tools which can be 
employed in pursuit of foreign policy goals and their ability to use these tools depends on 
certain structural features, “geoeconomic endowments” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, pp49 & 
87).  
 
Referring to China as the world’s leading practioner of geoeconomics, Blackwill and Harris 
explore China’s use of geoeconomics to obtain economic advantages, political influence and 
leverage through six case studies in Asia, asking when, why and how geoeconomic tools are 
used and how effective and significant they are. Two of the case studies, the expansion of 
China’s influence in South East Asia and the China-Pakistan-India triangular relations, are 
directly related to BRI/MSRI and are summarised in the following section. 
 
According to Blackwill and Harris the case studies raise three central questions, does 
geoeconomic strategy work, is geoeconomic statecraft recognised when occurring and why is 
China’s use of geoeconomics seemingly so effective? They conclude that in the case of China 
their geoeconomic strategy works, however, the answer to the second question is more 
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circumspect. The use of overt geoeconomic statecraft is growing but whether covert use is 
growing as well can only be assessed by the implied effect, if at all. Finally, China’s obvious 
success using geoeconomics in pursuit of its geopolitical strategy is due to its large share of 
so-called “geoeconomic endowments” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, pp130-34). 
 
“War by Other Means” is an attempt to develop a comprehensive and seminal  analytical 
framework based on geoeconomics, defined as the state’s “systematic use of economic 
instruments to accomplice geopolitical objectives” (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p1), but it 
remains part of the realist and geopolitical schools of international relations theories with its 
emphasis on the state as, if not the sole actor, then the main actor and security as its overall 
objective, or in Luttwak’s terminology “the logic of war in the grammar of commerce”. Despite 
their comprehensive analysis of China’s successful use of geoeconomics as part of its foreign 
policy strategy, their focus remains on how the US ought to or could use geoeconomics in its 
response to China’s growing influence in Asia and beyond. 
 
However, geoeconomics, as developed in “War by Other Means”, its analytical framework, its 
range of economic tools, its reference to “geoeconomic endowments” and its focus on when, 
why and how effective, is useful for analysing China’s BRI/MSRI in Europe.  Particularly 
because Blackwill and Harris, like Reilly before, do acknowledge geoeconomic measures’ 
multiple purposes, political as well as economic, commercial and cultural.  
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3. Methods and Methodology 
 
3.1. Research questions 
This dissertation focuses on three interrelated research questions and objectives concerning 
China’s BRI, particularly the extension of the MSRI into European waters and investments in 
European ports, with a view to: 
1. Identify why China is investing in commercial ports in Europe; 
2. Study Chinese investments in the Port of Piraeus in Greece and the Port of Rotterdam 
in the Netherlands, exploring to what extend these investments are dictated by 
security issues, attempts to gain political influence or economic, above all commercial 
considerations; 
3. Suggest whether the answers might have implications for how the EU and/or the 
member states have responded or ought to respond to China’s BRI/MSRI. 
 
Despite numerous academic and other studies of China’s contemporary foreign policy 
strategies and the BRI in particular, the Literature Review shows that the majority has focused 
on political and security aspects of the relationship between China and the US, while there 
has been only limited interest in China’s relationship with and investments in Europe, 
particularly investments in commercial ports in the EU, and hardly any has attempted to reach 
a comprehensive, nuanced explanation as to why China is investing heavily in these ports. 
Therefore, a comparative case study of Chinese investments in the Port of Piraeus (Piraeus) 
and the Port of Rotterdam (Rotterdam) provides an opportunity to assess whether these 
investments have different purposes, depending on the particulars of the ports as well as the 
host countries’ political and economic circumstances.  
 
This section sets out the preferred research strategy, explains why Blackwill’s and Harris’ 
geoeconomic analytical framework might be useful addressing the above research questions, 
outlines the framework’s tools and endowments and justifies the choice of Piraeus and 
Rotterdam for the case study. Furthermore, it deals with the research methodology, the 
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sources of information and the collection of data. Finally, it refers to the limitations and 
potential problems related to the chosen research strategy. 
 
3.2. Research strategy and analytical framework 
Blackwill’s and Harris’ list of geoeconomic instruments include seven, mainly economic tools: 
1. trade policy, which can be used positively or coercively; 2. investment policy, inbound and 
outbound, particularly state controlled portfolio and direct investments; 3. economic and 
financial sanctions, including multilateral sanctions, increasingly popular despite their mixed 
record; 4. cyberattacks, the most recent and, potentially, most effective coercive instrument;  
5. aid, economic, development, military or humanitarian, a longstanding, tried and tested 
instrument; 6. financial and monetary policy, widely used and one of most powerful 
instruments; and 7. energy and commodities, the supply of which is often used coercively but 
can be used positively (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, pp49-87). China has used most of these tools 
openly in connection with BRI or as part of United Nations sanctions, cyberattacks have been 
used covertly.      
 
The effectiveness of a particular tool is determined by four geoeconomic endowments: 1. the 
country’s ability to control outbound portfolio investments, FDI, debt or equity through state 
owned investment vehicles and enterprises or sovereign wealth funds; 2. domestic market 
features, inter alia size, growth rate, degree of control of import and export; 3. influence over 
commodity and energy flows, which depends on monopoly or monopsony power and 
centrality as a transit point between major buyers and sellers; and 4. centrality to the global 
financial system, e.g. reserve currency status and size of financial sectors (Blackwill & Harris, 
2017, pp87-92). China, due to its size, its economic might and high growth rates, its 
predominantly state-owned or -controlled economic and financial sectors and foreign trade, 
is exceptionally well endowed to take advantage of geoeconomic instruments in pursuit of its 
foreign policy strategies and is regularly described as the world’s leading practitioner of 
geoeconomics.   
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Blackwill and Harris explore China’s use of geoeconomic tools in six case studies of which two 
are related to the MSRI, the expansion of China’s influence in Southeast Asia and in the Indian 
Ocean. China’s main geopolitical objectives in Southeast Asia are building and maintaining 
secure trade routes, by land and by sea, expanding its political and military influence, 
disrupting US influence in the area and keeping friendly countries close. Under the umbrella 
of BRI/MSRI, China has built and invested in infrastructure, rail networks, roads, pipe lines 
and ports; signed bilateral and multilateral aid, investment and trade agreements; financed 
industrial development projects and encouraged direct investments as well as tourism; 
created the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, AIIB; and encouraged the Renminbi’s role 
as regional reserve currency. China has used coercive, even punitive, tools as well, including 
economic sanctions, trade embargoes and interruptions of flow of commodities and products, 
against the Philippines and Vietnam in particular. However, China’s increasing presence and 
influence in Southeast Asia is also dependent on the use of geopolitical, military tools, 
particularly in the South China Sea, where China’s growing naval power has caused problems 
vis-à-vis the neighbouring countries and the US. Blackwill and Harris conclude that China’s 
wide use of geoeconomic tools has increased its overall influence in Southeast Asia 
substantially but the success has been uneven and not always lasting, depending on the 
individual country’s closeness with and economic dependency on China and whether it has 
alternative sources of support (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, pp111-120). 
 
In the second case study, “Pakistan and India: China-Pakistan-India triangular relations and 
the growing role of geoeconomics”, Blackwill and Harris argue that China’s relations with 
Pakistan can only be “understood within the context of each’s relationship with India” 
(Blackwill & Harris, 2017, p120). Despite China’s historically close geopolitical, military, 
relationship with Pakistan there are four reasons, why geoeconomics has become the 
preferred medium of influence: 1. geoeconomic tools are less likely to provoke a military 
response from the US or India; 2. the BRICS cooperation and India’s growing economically and 
politically importance to China; 3. Pakistan’s growing military ties with the US; and 4. 
geoeconomics is China’s strongest medium in the present environment. China has employed 
a range of mainly positive tools in Pakistan. As part of BRI it has invested $46billion in the so-
called China-Pakistan economic corridor, which includes building and managing the large, 
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international Port of Gwadar surrounded by an industrial development zone, a new airport 
and a road network linking Gwadar with Western China. The corridor allows direct transport 
of oil and goods between China and the Indian Ocean, bypassing the South China Sea and, 
not least, the Malacca Strait. China has used other tools such as investments in nuclear power 
plants as well as direct loans ameliorating public debt and balance of payment problems, 
sometimes coercively when cut or temporarily withheld. These extensive geoeconomic 
efforts reflect Pakistan’s strategic importance for the implementation of BRI as well as 
geopolitically in relation to India, the Indian Ocean and the US. China’s geoeconomic 
initiatives in India, on the other hand, are narrow in scope and the tools employed limited to 
trade and investments (Blackwill & Harris, 2017, pp120-128). 
 
Others have used the geoeconomic analytical framework and included non-economic tools 
such as cultural and so-called people-to-people initiatives. The economist George Magnus in 
“Red Flags: Why Xi’s China is in Jeopardy” refers to Luttwak’s definition of geoeconomics, “the 
logic of war in the grammar of commerce”, and describes BRI as China’s latest attempt to 
promote economic and political influence across Eurasia and beyond (Magnus, 2018, pp4 & 
8). Magnus argues that China’s current foreign policy strategy is best described in 
geoeconomic terms, a conversion of economic might to regional and global political influence 
with the purpose of challenging the US’ influence. BRI is “a massive connectivity project” using 
geoeconomic tools, which politically and strategically raises important questions: is it a 
Eurasian development project, as China claims or, perhaps also, an economic, commercial 
and international relations project, designed to benefit mainly China, a “China First strategy”? 
(Magnus, 2018, pp175 & 179). If the latter, BRI causes “serious security concerns” and 
requires a new strategy for engaging with China, not least understanding the economic 
challenges facing China and what drives President Xi and the Party (Magnus, 2018, pp 13 & 
204).  
 
Philippe le Corre’s comparative case study of China’s political influence in four Southern 
European countries concludes that China is using geoeconomic tools for geopolitical 
purposes, applying soft and hard political power regionally and globally. Through the BRI 
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China engages in extensive outbound investments not only in developing countries but also 
in Europe, building and investing in infrastructure, investing in manufacturing, utilities, media, 
IT and technology groups, promoting bilateral trade, providing financial assistance, and 
encouraging people-to-people as well as cultural cooperation (Corre, 2018, pp2-6). Corre’s 
case study of China’s influence in Greece lists geoeconomic tools including investments, trade 
and financial aid but also soft power initiatives such as new Confucius institutes, cultural 
exchanges, academic cooperation and tourism. China’s actual influence on Greece and its 
foreign policy is assessed by studying voting patterns in EU and UN, and the national 
perception of China’s presence and influence is measured by the annual Pew Research Center 
survey and others. The study concludes that economically weak regions with anti-European 
sentiments such as Southern Europe, even Eastern and Central Europe, might succumb to 
strong Chinese influence in the future; the outcome depends on EU’s response (Corre, 2018, 
pp38-41). 
 
James Reilly’s analysis of China’s use of economic statecraft (see above section 2.3) lists three 
geoeconomic tools available for China: “providing capital through foreign aid or direct 
investments; expanding trade via preferential trade agreements or state procurements; and 
monetary policies such as purchasing foreign bonds or intervening in currency markets”, used 
as incentive or punitive measures (Reilly, 2013, p2). In a subsequent article about China’s use 
of economic statecraft in Europe, Reilly applies the same analytical framework, focusing on 
three case studies: China’s attempts to discourage European countries from receiving Dalai 
Lama; secure market economy status within the WTO regime; and maximise influence in 
Europe after the 2008 financial crisis. China succeeded in discouraging leaders of large EU 
countries from meeting Dalai Lama, but did not manage to generate support for its market 
economy status, nor did European public attitude towards China improve. Leading Reilly to 
conclude that China has been “proven ineffective in turning its economic heft into political 
influence” in Europe, indeed the purpose of these investments might be purely commercial 
(Reilly, 2017, p182 and 2013, p11). 
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Magnus, Corre and Reilly all use the geoeconomic analytical framework. However, while their 
range of economic tools is more limited than Blackwill’s and Harris’, they include non-
economic tools used by China in their pursuit of influence in Europe. Adding so-called “soft 
power” tools, cultural exchanges, academic cooperation and promotion of tourism, to the 
analysis and using them in conjunction with economic tools contributes to the understanding 
of China’s BRI/MSRI strategy.          
 
3.3. Comparative case study of the ports of Piraeus and Rotterdam 
The ports of Piraeus and Rotterdam illustrate China’s extensive and very different port 
investments in the EU under the umbrella of the MSRI. Geographically the two host countries 
are far apart, Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Netherlands at the English 
Channel, but both countries are among the smaller EU member states, both are members of 
the Eurozone and both have long, proud maritime traditions. However, the Netherlands is a 
founding member of EU, a stable, old democracy and a longstanding supporter of further 
integration within the Community. Greece, on the other hand, only joined in 1981 after the 
overturn of its military regime and its relationship with Brussels, particularly after the 2009 
Eurozone crisis, has been problematic. Also, the Greek economy is weak and struggling within 
an unstable political environment, while the Dutch is open, fundamentally sound and 
prosperous, its GDP per capita is twice the size of the Greek. 
 
Also, the two ports and investments are very different. Rotterdam is, and has been for many 
years, the largest container shipping port in Europe, no. 11 globally, with rail and canal 
networks reaching the most densely populated and developed industrial areas in North-
western   Europe. The two Chinese investors, Hutchison and COSCO, own and control three 
of Rotterdam’s 12 container terminals. Piraeus, until COSCO’s involvement, was a medium 
sized container and ferry port with only limited transit capacity, however, COSCO has full 
control of the whole port complex.     
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3.4. Methodology 
This dissertation applies qualitative research, conducted through desktop searches and 
interviews with qualified practioners in the maritime industry. Also, the author has worked 
for many years in investment banking at Scandinavian and British banks, specialising in 
finance of commercial shipping. She has extensive insider and specialist knowledge of the 
economics and workings of the shipping industry, an area largely unknown to outsiders.     
 
Written primary sources include official documents, reports, annual reports and statistical 
data. Secondary sources include academic books and articles, think tank papers, specialised 
intelligence, relevant websites and press reports.      
 
3.5. Limitations and potential problems 
As this dissertation is based on a comparative case study of only two of the more than 15 EU 
ports with Chinese investors, the conclusions cannot prove any assumptions in the affirmative 
but can show which preconceptions are likely to be wrong or only partly correct. If it is 
generally assumed that China’s investments in EU ports are driven by a wish to gain political 
leverage, even a small comparative case study might unveil investments dictated by economic 
and commercial considerations. 
 
Most foreign statistics and other information about China, including economic and trade data, 
distinguish between mainland China and Hong Kong, while official Chinese data as produced 
by China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) include Hong Kong, affecting the value of 
analysing for example China’s FDI into EU. MOFCOM’s figures for annual FDI flows and stock 
FDI are substantially larger than those published by UNCTAD, EU and the Rhodium Group, and 
the latter are not in agreement either. The differences are partly due to the fact that 
MOFCOM’s figures include FDI originating in Hong Kong and certain offshore holding 
companies, while the others tend not to and partly to lack of a commonly agreed definition 
of FDI.    
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Also, the distinction between mainland Chinese companies and those listed or based in Hong 
Kong, the latter not included when for example Chinese investments in EU ports are analysed, 
is misleading as it does not take into account the actual and potential influence Beijing has on 
Chinese global companies such as COSCO, Hutchison and China Merchants, whether state-
owned and based in mainland China or not (COSCO and Hutchison see sections 4.5 & 4.6 
below). The 1984 treaty between the UK and China concerning Hong Kong, which came into 
force at the handover in 1997, states that Hong Kong is part of China with status of a Special 
Administrative Region (HKSAR). While the regime, often referred to as the “one country, two 
systems”, allows for a high degree of independence as regards internal matters and trade, 
foreign affairs and the legal interpretation of Hong Kong’s constitution (the Basic Law) are 
under the control of Beijing (Aust, 2013, pp64-67).  
 
The following section includes a brief overview of China’s foreign and economic strategies, 
setting the context into which BRI/MSRI was first introduced in 2013. Followed by a 
presentation of BRI and MSRI with particular reference to port investments in Europe and, 
finally, a description of the comparative case study results. 
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4. Belt and Road Initiative, case studies 
 
4.1. China’s economic policy 
Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform program in the 1980s introduced an element of economic 
pragmatism into China’s foreign policy in contrast to the Post-War period’s focus on political 
and security issues. Deng’s 1978-slogan “reform and opening up” and the subsequent 24-
character instruction, including “hide our capacities and bide our time”, were concerted 
efforts to steer China’s foreign policy towards global reengagement, politically and 
economically, a policy continued by his successors (Kissinger, 2012, pp335, 438 & 441). At the 
beginning of this century China was among the top global FDI recipients, a leading exporter 
and a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
 
4.2. The Belt and Road Initiative 
In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis China became the second largest world 
economy and the successful 1999 “going global” and subsequent “peaceful rise 
development” strategies were replaced by increasingly assertive, even nationalistic, 
strategies, reflecting its global ambitions. These were accompanied by renewed interest in 
the idea of “the China dream” which, according to Xi Jinping, “is the inner meaning of 
upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics”, in essence “a rich and 
powerful country, revitalising the nation and enhancing the wellbeing of the people” 
(Ferdinand, 2016, p946). These developments culminated in Xi’s launch in 2013 of BRI and 
MSRI and subsequently the “China Solution” strategy, first mentioned at the G20 summit in 
China in 2016 and further developed at Davos in 2017. In his speech at the summit Xi 
emphasised China’s wish to open up and achieve win-win outcomes through peaceful 
development, economic globalisation and a new type of international relations (Xi, 2016). 
Support for the existing international order, but also a warning of China’s determination to 
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be involved in building a new order and transforming its low-cost manufacturing-based 
economy.  
 
Xi Jinping launched BRI and MSRI in two speeches in Kazakhstan and Indonesia in the autumn 
2013, a series of overlapping infrastructure projects based on the ancient Silk Roads, 
consisting of rail corridors (the Belt) linking China and Asia with Europe and maritime corridors 
(the Road) from China to Africa and the Middle East through the South China Sea and the 
Indian Ocean. The 2015 official “Vision and Actions” paper described BRI as a “systematic 
project … strategic propellers for hinterland development … to help promote economic 
prosperity in the countries along the Belt and Road and regional economic cooperation, 
strengthen exchanges and mutual learning between different civilizations and promote world 
peace”, covering Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Europe. By then BRI included policy 
cooperation, connectivity of infrastructure and facilities, unimpeded trade and investment, 
financial integration and people-to-people bonds (Vision, 2015). Information about how many 
countries have signed BRI agreements or MOUs varies from about 70 to 157, even 170+, the 
texts are seldom published.   
 
The significance of BRI for China’s foreign policy strategy became clear in October 2017 when 
it was written into the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) constitution.  
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The official goals for MSRI are included in the 2017 “Vision for Maritime Cooperation under 
the Belt and Road Initiative” which envisages China engaging “in all-dimensional and broad-
scoped maritime cooperation and build open and inclusive … Blue Partnership[s] to forge a 
“blue engine” for sustainable development” by pursuing five priorities: green development, 
ocean-based prosperity, maritime security, innovative growth and collaborative governance. 
A range of activities promoting maritime connectivity, security and policy, establishing 
industrial parks of economic and free trade zones, building shipping service networks, 
constructing new ports, facilitating maritime transport and participating in Arctic affairs. All 
to be achieved through mutual cooperation and intergovernmental agreements between 
China and the countries along the Road (Vision, 2017).  
 
China has consistently explained BRI’s purposes with references to mainly economic goals: 
promote connectivity and regional development in China’s western provinces, address issues 
of domestic industrial overcapacity and capital surpluses, open access to resources and new 
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markets, integrate the Renminbi in the international financial system, and secure lines of 
transportation at sea. Despite the official emphasis on BRI’s mutual development and 
economic aspects, not a challenge to the existing world order but win-win projects, the 
response from the West and, increasingly, from neighbouring Asian countries has been 
suspicion, outright negative. Focusing instead on what they see as China’s strategic 
objectives: a geopolitical powerplay, an attempt to create a new world order and a potential 
debt trap, accompanied by growing cultural influence. The Chinese professor Liu Wei in an 
article for the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center has acknowledged that BRI “reflects a more assertive 
Chinese leadership on the global stage and plays a central role in Xi’s fight for the great 
renaissance of the Chinese nation” and the international community “views the Belt and Road 
through a zero-sum, geopolitical lens” (Liu, 2018, p1). However, according to Liu, China “does 
not aim to change the global economic order [instead] the BRI will allow China to play a larger 
role in setting the rules and norms and providing global public goods, especially if developed 
Western countries continue to withdraw” (Liu, 2018, pp2-3). 
 
4.3. BRI/MSRI in Europe  
In 2003 the EU and China agreed to define each other as “strategic partners” and since then 
the EU has become China’s largest trading partner with an annual bilateral trade in goods in 
2017 of €573bn and a trade deficit of €177bn in China’s favour, while China is the EU’s second 
largest partner after the US (Trade EU-China).  
 
Since 2013 China’s (including Hong Kong’s) FDI stock1 in EU has more than quadrupled to 
€132bn, now equivalent to EU’s in China (MERICS, 2018, p17). However, China’s share of FDI 
stock in Europe amounts to less than 5%, the US’ share is 40%. The UK, Germany, France and 
the Netherlands are among the largest EU recipients, while investments in Greece remain 
 
1 “FDI is defined as an investment reflecting a lasting interest and control [at least 10% of voting shares] by a 
foreign direct investor, resident in one economy, in an enterprise resident in another economy (foreign affi-
liate). FDI inflows comprise capital provided by a foreign direct investor to a foreign affiliate, or capital 
received by a foreign direct investor from a foreign affiliate. FDI outflows represent the same flows from the 
perspective of the other economy. FDI flows are presented on a net basis, i.e. as credits less debits” 
(UNCTAD, 2018, p52). FDI stock is the net cumulative FDI for a given period (FT Lexicon). 
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small. Chinese FDI cover a range of sectors with the transport and infrastructure sector the 
second largest (ETNC, 2017, p28). However, China’s economic interests in the EU are 
significantly higher than these figures indicate. FDI numbers are very uncertain and China use 
other economic tools as well, including financial and monetary instruments, such as portfolio 
investments2 and long-term sovereign loans, the former in countries with strong economies 
and the latter in countries with weak economies, for example Greece. Like FDI, these tools 
potentially enhance China’s leverage.   
 
BRI related cooperation remain bilateral and 16 EU member states have signed general MOUs 
with China, including 11 Eastern European members, under the 17+1 Format, as well as 
Greece3, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal and Italy4. Others, including Germany and the 
Netherlands, have signed limited agreements covering inter alia transport and infrastructure 
(European Parliament Study, 2018, p32). 
  
 
2 “Portfolio investment is defined as cross-border transactions and positions involving equity or debt securities, 
other than those included in direct investment or reserve assets”, intended for financial gain without 
creating lasting interest in or management control (IMF).  
3 Greece signed a bilateral MOU in August 2018 and joined the 17+1 Format in 2019. 
4 Italy signed a BRI MOU in March 2019, the first, and only, G7 member country to do so. 
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4.4. China’s port investments and maritime interests  
Chinese global port ownership clusters along key trade routes and maritime chokepoints 
Sources: King’s College, London; FT research (FT Investigation, 2017); CIA (shipping routes) 
 
By the end of 2017, Chinese companies5 controlled more than 10% of EU’s port capacity 
through ownership of ports and container terminals (fully or significant stakes) from the 
Eastern Mediterranean to the Atlantic and the Baltic Sea, including more than15 ports in 10 
EU member states (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, 
Sweden and the UK). Benefitting from cheap finance provided by Chinese state and state-
controlled banks and special funds, companies like COSCO, China Merchants6, Hutchison and 
SIPG have invested upwards of $50bn in ports and port projects worldwide and by 2017 they 
owned or had invested in 33 of the world’s top 50 container ports (Drewry, 2017 & FT 
Investigation, 2017). 
 
However, China’s maritime interests are not limited to ports. China is the world’s largest ship 
building nation; controls the largest commercial fleet (Greece is no. 2); owns the second 
largest container shipping company (COSCO); transports about 25% of all containers handled 
 
5 Mainland China and Hong Kong based. 
6 Through investments in French container ship owner CMC-CGM 
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by the world’s top 20 container shipping companies (Danish Shipping, 2017 & UNCTAD 
Review, 2018, p32); and Chinese banks and leasing companies are among the largest 
providers of ship finance. In 2018 a Norwegian study labelled China “the world’s overall 
strongest maritime nation” measured on four indexes: ship owning and management; 
finance; technology and ship building; as well as ports and logistics (Menon, 2018).  
 
4.5. Case study: Greece, Port of Piraeus 
According to Wang Yiwei7 cooperating with China on BRI is an opportunity for Europe to 
revive a declining European civilisation and move the geopolitical centre of gravity away from 
the US as “the implementation of BRI turns Central and Eastern Europe into China’s new 
European portal”. China and the EU share common ground on maritime issues, and Greece is 
“China’s important gateway to Europe and a bridgehead in cooperation between China, 
Europe and Middle East” (ISPI, 2015, pp103-104 & 107).  
 
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis Greece faced serious economic, political and social 
problems due to large foreign debt and substantial, chronic fiscal deficits, endangering its 
stability and that of the EURO zone at large. Support from the EU Commission, the European 
Central Bank and the IMF, the troika, was eventually provided but subjected to wide-ranging 
political and economic austerity measures, including privatisation of a range of state-owned 
assets, including Piraeus.  
 
The volume of Chinese FDI in Greece is difficult to assess as estimates differ widely from Bank 
of Greece: €585mio, Rhodium Group: €840mio, European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD): €4bn to Greek media reports: €7bn. However, the largest FDI investors 
in Greece remain Germany, France and the UK. The majority of Chinese BRI related 
investment projects in Greece have been in the areas of transport infrastructure, energy, 
 
7 Professor at the School of International Studies, Research Fellow of Chinese Center for Contemporary World 
Studies at the International Department of CCP, former diplomat at China’s Mission to the EU and fellow at 
Yale University (ISPI, 2015). 
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telecommunications and tourism, with COSCO’s investments in Piraeus the flagship project 
(IIER, 2017, p16).    
FDI in Greece from China & Hong Kong* (€mio)     
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016** Subtotal 
China - - - - 1.2 0.8 - 72.8 16.9 18.8 29.3 139.8 
Hong Kong 3.5 0.7 0.6 1.6 12.9 10.2 16.1 19.0 27.6 31.7 317.0 440.9 
Total 3.5 0.7 0.6 1.6 14.1 11.0 16.1 91.8 44.5 50.5 346.3 580.7 
Source: Bank of Greece           
*the relatively large figures for Hong Kong are due to COSCO SPL's registration there  
**provisional data           
 
COSCO’ investments in Piraeus 
Cooperation between Greece and China, particularly on trade and investments in transport 
infrastructure, grew after the centre-right Prime Minister Karamanlis’ visit to China in 2006 
and intensified after 2008, when Greece was seeking non-EU partners and investors. An 
initial deal spelling out China’s ambition to turn Piraeus into a main container hub in the 
Mediterranean was signed in November 2008 during the then Chinese President Hu Jintao’s 
official visit to Greece.  
 
In 2009 COSCO Shipping Ports Ltd (COSCO SPL), a subsidiary of the Chinese state-owned 
shipping company COSCO, signed a 35 years lease agreement to operate two of the three 
piers at Piraeus’ container terminal, the third pier remained under management of the 
state-owned Piraeus Port Authority. The lease agreement included a €50mio initial 
payment, fixed annual lease payments plus a percentage of revenues. The agreement was 
valued at a total of €4.3bn, however, due to a discount for investment obligations, the 
actual net present value of the agreement was lower. The new investments included deeper 
water docks and larger cranes, enabling Piraeus to accommodate the latest generation of 
large containerships and increase capacity.  
 
At the time Piraeus did not even figure among the top 50 global container ports but COSCO 
SPL turned it into one of the world’s fastest growing ports and in 2017 it was ranked no. 37 
globally, no. 7 among European ports and no. 3 in the Mediterranean, reaching a throughput 
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of 4 million TEU8 p.a., of which about 75% was transit traffic (AIPH, Clingendael, 2014, pp12-
13). COSCO SPL also invested in improved transit facilities and built a new railway link 
between the port and the Greek national rail system. COSCO’s investment was allegedly 
championed by the Greek shipowners and in 2011 China created a special US$5bn shipping 
fund, enabling Greek shipowners to place newbuilding orders at Chinese shipyards.     
 
After the launch of BRI in 2013 the investments in Piraeus were “re-labelled” a BRI/MSRI 
project and COSCO SPL agreed to invest another €230mio in further renovations of the two 
leased piers plus construct a new adjacent oil product terminal. In return the Greek 
government forfeited the annual lease payments until such time Greece’s GDP reaches its 
pre-crisis level (Clingendael, 2014, pp10-12). In 2013-14 COSCO SPL signed a number of 
agreements with large manufacturers, Hewlett-Packard and Huawei among others, 
channelling a substantial part of their European distribution through Piraeus.       
 
During Prime Minister Li Keqiang’s visit to Greece in June 2014, the two countries signed trade 
agreements worth €3.4bn and 19 bilateral cooperation agreements promoting political, 
economic and cultural cooperation, reemphasising the strategic aim to turn Greece into 
“China’s gateway to Europe” (The Diplomat, 2016). In July 2014 President Xi Jinping paid an 
official visit, deepening the partnership.  However, the Greek government’s subsequent 
attempts to persuade China to invest €1.5bn in government bonds failed, China invested only 
€200mio (Varoufakis, 2017, pp318-20). Also, trade volumes remain relatively low, Greece’s 
export to China amounted to US$557mio in 2014 and fell to US$535mio in 2017, while China’s 
export grew from US$2.9bn to US$3.1bn over the same period (World Bank). 
 
Privatisation of a 67% stake in Piraeus Port Authority, which controlled the repair docks, the 
ferry and cruise terminal as well as one pier at the container terminal, began in the spring of 
2014. COSCO SPL, one among five bidders, was expected to win. However, after the new 
coalition government of the radical left Syriza and the right-of-centre Independent Greeks 
 
8 TEU: twenty-foot equivalent unit based on a 20-foot long container box. 
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took office in January 2015, the privatisation process was stopped, allegedly due to resistance 
from the dockworkers’ union and the communist party. Subsequently, during a visit to China 
in the spring of 2015 launching the China-Greece Maritime Cooperation Year, the Greek 
deputy prime minister announced the government was ready to sell a majority stake to one 
of the five original bidders (ETNC, 2015, pp38-39). The privatisation process was restarted in 
the autumn 2015, and COSCO SPL won the public tender.  
 
The government’s attempts to weaken COSCO SPL’s powers were largely unsuccessful, the 
agreement was ratified by parliament in June 2016 and shortly afterwards the then Prime 
Minister Tsipras paid an official visit to China. The final agreement gave COSCO SPL full 
management control of Piraeus through a 51% stake in the Port Authority with the promise 
of another 16% after five years, subject to certain investments. In return COSCO SPL 
undertook to pay €281mio, plus €88mio for the second stake, and invest another €350mio in 
new facilities over 10 years.  
 
At the time COSCO’s chairman stated “our goal is to help Piraeus Port become the largest 
container [transhipment] hub in Europe” as well as the biggest ship repair facility in the 
Eastern Mediterranean and one of the wold’s most important cruise ports. However, the 
former depends on easy access through Greece and the Western Balkan or Bulgaria/Rumania 
to the Eastern and Central European railway network. It was, therefore, a surprise that China 
did not bid for the operator of the Greek railways when it was privatised in 2016 (ETNC, 2016, 
pp31-33). 
 
During the BRI Forum in Beijing in May 2017 China and Greece signed a so-called 2017-19 
Action Plan dealing with funding of new projects, COSCO’s plans for shipbuilding and ship 
repair facilities in Piraeus and on the islands (IIER, 2017, pp49-50).  
 
In June 2017 COSCO SPL, as operator of Piraeus, signed a cooperation agreement with 
Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG), the state-owned operator of China’s, and the 
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world’s, largest container port. The agreement covered training, project planning, 
information exchange and technical assistance, creating synergies and new business 
opportunities (Marine Link, 2017). SIPG has similar agreements with other port operators in 
the US and Europe, including Rotterdam.   
 
Early 2018 COSCO SPL published a €550mio master investment plan for Piraeus and the 
surrounding areas. The plan included a fourth pier at the container terminal, a new ship yard 
facility, the largest in the Eastern Mediterranean, specialising in repair and servicing of cruise 
ship and mega yachts, and a large, new cruise terminal, turning Piraeus into the homeport in 
the Mediterranean for Chinese cruise ships and passengers, plus four new hotels and a 
shopping mall. According to the plan, the “ultimate goal is for Piraeus port to be established 
as a worldwide transportation hub [by 2021] and in this way enhancing the development of 
the Greek economy in general”, turning Piraeus into one of the five largest ports in Europe 
(Seatrade Maritime, 2018a).  COSCO SPL also signalled interest in smaller ports on the Greek 
islands in order to create a cruise network in the Aegean and the Adriatic and benefitting from 
the third Greek privatisations phase covering regional port authorities.  
 
Towards the end of 2018 Greece’s Council of State rejected parts of COSCO SPL’s master 
investment plan with reference to environmental impact studies but most likely also 
reflecting public objections from, among others, construction companies, local businesses 
and government ministries, fearing competition and seeing it as a threat to the surrounding 
area’s existing economy (Seatrade Maritime, 2018b). Allegedly the US also made its 
opposition clear to the Greek government. However, during a visit to China in March 2019 
the then Greek foreign minister assured his Chinese counterpart of Greece’s strong support 
of BRI/MSRI and wish to continue playing “a constructive role in promoting bilateral relations 
and Europe-China cooperation” (TNH, 2019). Despite these assurances, the Ministry of 
Culture later obstructed parts of the plan with reference to overriding archaeological and 
cultural interests (Ekathimerini, 2019). Subsequently, during president Xi’s state visit in 
November, the newly elected centre-right government signed a MOU supporting COSCO SPL’s 
expansion plan for Piraeus.    
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Greece’s second largest port, Thessaloniki, was privatised in 2018 after a protracted process, 
which at one stage generated serious interest from the Hutchison group. However, the 
bidding was won by a European consortium (PortEconomics, 2018). COSCO was not involved.  
 
China COSCO Shipping Corporation Limited (COSCO) is a Chinese state-owned company 
(SOE) headquartered in Shanghai. It is a worldwide business conglomerate with the mission 
to globalise Chinese economy by providing integrated logistics and supply chain services. 
Through organic growth, mergers and acquisitions COSCO has become one of the world’s 
largest companies, ranked by the Financial Times among the top 500. The group controls the 
world’s largest integrated shipping company, owning the second largest container shipping 
company, the largest dry bulk fleet, a sizeable number of large oil tankers and cruise ships as 
well as ports and ship yards. COSCO has invested in and operates 56 terminals, including 51 
container terminals, worldwide. Also, COSCO is involved in trade, manufacturing and finance 
of BRI related projects, operating worldwide as well as through more than 1,000 subsidiaries 
in China. It holds majority or controlling shares in companies listed in China, Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Tokyo. Following the merger in 2016 with the China Shipping (Group) 
Company, a mainly inland and costal operator, COSCO changed its name from China Ocean 
Shipping (Group) Company (COSCO website). 
COSCO Shipping Ports Limited (COSCO SPL), until 2016 known as COSCO Pacific Ltd., is the 
group’s main port owner and operator with a presence in 36 ports in mainland China, 
Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Europe, including Greece and the Netherlands. It is listed 
in Hong Kong and the controlling shareholder (47%) is Hong Kong listed COSCO Shipping 
Holdings Co., Ltd. in which COSCO holds a controlling share (45%). 
COSCO SPL’s stated mission is: “working towards building a global terminal network with                                                                                                                                    
controlling stake that offers linkage effects on costs, services and synergies, a synergistic 
platform that offers mutual benefits to all in the shipping industry, connecting global routes 
and becoming truly “the ports for all people”” (COSCO SPL, website). 
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However, this largely commercial mission statement, does not alter the fact that COSCO SPL’s 
controlling shareholder is a state-owned company, whose chief executives are appointed by 
the CCP (Clingendael, 2014, p26). Therefore, the group’s goals are likely to be not only 
commercial but also political, supporting MSRI and securing China’s maritime supply chains 
through its global dominance in shipping and ports.  
 
4.6. Case study: the Netherlands, Port of Rotterdam 
 
While China appears to target two European regions for BRI projects, Central and Eastern 
Europe through the 17+1 (including Greece) Format and the Mediterranean through bilateral 
agreements, BRI related projects are also noticeable in Western and Northern Europe, 
including the Netherlands. 
 
In 2017 the Netherlands was ranked no. 6 for inward FDI flows worldwide and no. 2 among 
the EU member states. The main investors are the US, Luxembourg and the UK, totalling 45%, 
while China, including Hong Kong, contributes only about 1% (UNCTAD, 2018 & Nordea). The 
main foreign investments are in financial and insurance services, but Chinese investments 
focus on high-tech, telecommunication and the automotive industry as well as agriculture and 
food. Investments in transport infrastructure remain limited. While the Netherlands is the 5th 
largest recipient of Chinese FDI in the EU and the third largest EU investor in China these 
relatively strong ties do not seem to be driven by Chinese attempts to gain political leverage, 
rather by an attempt to secure access to advanced technology, industrial knowhow and 
agricultural products, enhancing China’s global competitiveness in line with the BRI and 
“Made in China 2025” strategies (ETNC, 2017, pp98-99).    
 
FDI in the Netherlands from China* & Hong Kong** (€mio)  
  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total 
China 127 15 91 79 453 55 298 1,750 2,279 318   5,465 
Hong Kong             257 -1,728 1,556 396 4,248 4,729 
* Source: Rhodium Group          
**Source: OECD Statistics          
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In March 2014 Xi Jinping made his first official state visit to Europe as president, visiting 
France, Germany, the Netherlands and the EU Commission. During his stay in the Netherlands 
the two countries signed a joint statement, “the Establishment of an Open and Pragmatic 
Partnership for Comprehensive Cooperation”, which did not include the usual term “strategic 
partnership”, nor any references to BRI, launched only six months earlier and a prominent 
subject on the agenda for the President’s subsequent visits to other EU member states (ETNC, 
2016, p42).   
 
Hutchison’s and COSCO’s investments in Rotterdam 
Rotterdam, a state-owned enterprise, consists of 12 container terminals and is Europe’s 
largest container port, no. 11 globally. Goods originating in China make up about 25% of all 
goods arriving. Also, it is the western terminus of one of the BRI Economic Belts, the Chengdu-
Tilburg-Rotterdam Express opened in 2016 (ETNC, 2016, p42). 
 
The Hong Kong Chinese port owner and operator, Hutchison Ports Holding Group (HPH), has 
long been involved in the Netherlands, owning and controlling four containership terminals, 
including two 2010-build deep sea terminals in Rotterdam, the ECT Delta and ECT Euromax 
Terminals, and ECT, the oldest and largest container terminal operator in Rotterdam. ECT 
manages six container terminals in the Rotterdam – Antwerp - Duisburg area as well as 
terminals worldwide, including the UK’s largest container port, Felixstove (see below 
“Hutchison”). Also, in 2019 ECT bought one of APM’s9 two deep sea container terminals in 
Rotterdam, the Maasvlakte I.   
 
In 2016 COSCO SPL bought a 35% stake in HPH’s ECT Euromax Terminal in Rotterdam, paying 
US$125mio for the equity investment. The terminal is one of the newest and technologically 
most advanced terminals in Rotterdam, with a maximum throughput of 2.5 million TEU p.a., 
 
9 Port and terminal operator owned by the Danish Maersk Group. 
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and placed at the entrance from the North Sea. Rotterdam was already COSCO’s main 
container feeder hub in North-western Europe and the Netherlands China’s second largest 
trading partner in EU. In 2017 the Netherlands imported goods valued US$40.6bn from China 
and exported US$12.6bn with transit trade amounting to 2/3 of imports and 1/3 of export. At 
the time, COSCO reiterated Rotterdam’s strategic importance, located at the junction of the 
land-based “Silk Road Economic Belt” and ocean-going “Maritime Silk Road” (ETNC, 2016, 
pp41-42): 
“The Board expects COSCO Shipping to continue to deploy ultra-large container vessels 
to the European shipping route and call the Port of Rotterdam as its major hub in the 
region. The company’s investment in a container terminal in the Port of Rotterdam is 
not only in line with the company’s strategy of investing in overseas hubs, but also 
coordinates with COSCO Shipping’s hub strategy, resulting in good synergy” (World 
Maritime News, 2016). 
  
Contrary to COSCO, CK Hutchison Holdings Limited (Hutchison) is not state-owned nor 
headquartered in mainland China, it is registered in Cayman Islands, listed and headquartered 
in Hong Kong. Hutchison is the result the merger in 2014 of the Hutchison Whampoa Group 
and Cheung Kong Holdings. It is a global conglomerate involved in ports and port services, 
real estate, retail, infrastructure, energy and telecommunication. 
Hutchison Whampoa originated from two port owning companies established in Hong Kong 
in the 19th century by a British merchant and merged in 1977 by another British businessman. 
Due to financial problems HSBC Bank subsequently acquired a controlling shareholding, which 
it sold to Li Ka-shing’s Cheung Kong group in 1979 (Wikipedia).   
Hutchison Ports Holding Group (HPH), a wholly owned subsidiary, is responsible for the 
group’s port and port services business. HPH owns or has ownership stakes in more than 50  
ports worldwide (except the US), including 11 ports in seven EU member states, four in the 
Netherlands, eight in mainland China and two in Hong Kong (HPH Website). In 2002 HPH, 
acquired European Container Terminals (ECT), the leading container terminal operator in 
Europe responsible for handling the majority of terminals in Rotterdam, including those 
owned and controlled by Hutchison and COSCO (ECT Website). 
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According to the latest Annual Report 2017, the then chairman now senior advisor, Mr Li Ka-
shing controls about 30% of the shares in Hutchison. Mr Li, whose son Li Tzar Kuoi replaced 
him as chairman and group co-managing director in May 2018, founded and owned Cheung 
Kong Holdings, originally a real estate developer and property investment company. He was 
born in 1928 in mainland China and came to Hong Kong in 1940, when his family fled the 
Japanese invaders. Li has retained close ties with high ranking officials in China and Hong Kong 
which, according to an article in Encyclopaedia Britannica, has benefitted his business but also 
raised criticism and suspicion. Hutchison has not been permitted to manage or invest in ports 
in the US and its potential ownership of ports at both ends of the Panama Canal raised 
questions in Congress about security risks. Also, Li has been accused of attempting to 
influence the political climate in Hong Kong.  His charitable foundation is present in 12 
countries, with 22 projects in mainland China alone (Hutchison’s website & Britannica). 
While China has no known ownership in Hutchison, the controlling shareholder and influential 
decision maker is a first-generation Hong Kong Chinese with strong ties to Beijing, direct and 
through his charitable foundation, and the group has extensive investments and business 
interest in mainland China. It is therefore not unreasonable to assume Hutchison’s business 
strategy is at least aligned with official Chinese policy, including the MSRI strategy. 
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5. Analysis 
 
5.1. Why is China investing in ports in Europe? 
BRI/MSRI are integral parts of China’s foreign policy strategy and the original BRI goals were 
presented as primarily economic, win-win development projects based on cooperation and 
connectivity. MSRI was based on mutual interests in maritime issues, “Blue Partnerships”, 
maritime cooperation and connectivity, including ports. In Blanchard’s interpretation, MSRI 
is an economic and political strategy connecting transport infrastructure and inter-state 
politics (Blanchard, 2017, p261), while Chinese academics, politicians business leaders 
describe it as China’s efforts to turn Central and South-eastern Europe into a gateway for 
Chinese interests in the Mediterranean and Europe at large. 
 
COSCO’s activities in Piraeus have been the subject of much attention in China as well as in 
Europe, while Hutchison’s and COSCO’s investments in Rotterdam remain virtually unnoticed. 
Chinese public statements reflect the different ambitions: turning Greece into “China’s 
gateway to Europe” and “help Piraeus Port become the largest container hub in Europe” in 
contrast with COSCO’s aim to secure continued access to “the Port of Rotterdam as its major 
hub in the region”. 
 
5.2. Case studies, similarities and differences, geoeconomic tools 
The case studies of Chinese investments in Piraeus and Rotterdam show similarities but also 
many differences, not only are the two host countries’ economic and political environments 
very different, so are the Chinese declared investment goals. China’s economic relations with 
the Netherlands, and North-western Europe at large, are extensive, longstanding and cover a 
multitude of sectors. Hutchison’s and COSCO’s investments in Rotterdam can therefore be 
seen, more as a continued interest in securing and maintaining access to the largest and most 
efficient container port and tranship hub in Europe as well as the terminal for one of the BRI 
rail corridors. On the other hand, at the time of COSCO’s first investment in 2009, Piraeus was 
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a medium sized port, servicing mainly domestic ferry and passenger traffic, with three 
container shipping piers and limited transit traffic. In the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis 
Greece was in economic and political turmoil and economic relations with China sparse. Also, 
Chinese investments in Rotterdam cover only a small part of the port, while COSCO SPL 
controls Piraeus, being the operator and majority investor with the Greek state maintaining 
a minority stake.  
 
Only one of Blackwill’s and Harris’ economic tools, investment policy, is relevant in the case 
of HPH’s and COSCO SPLs involvement in Rotterdam. While it can be assumed that COSCO, 
being state-owned with state and party appointed management, would not make significant 
foreign investments without the ultimate approval, explicit or implicit, of the Chinese 
authorities, HPH’s investment motivations are more opaque. However, despite being a public 
company based in Hong Kong, the controlling shareholder and top management are Chinese 
with close business and personal ties to Beijing, it is therefore likely HPH’s foreign investments 
are at least in line with China’s BRI/MSRI and foreign policy strategies.  
 
Blackwill’s and Harris’ investment policy tool also applies to COSCO’s investment in Piraeus 
but China has used other economic tools as well. When the Greek government in 2015 
stopped the privatisation of Piraeus port authority and then only approved COSCO SPL’s 
purchase in the summer of 2016 after prolonged, difficult negotiations, the chain of events 
gives a clear impression of Beijing’s direct involvement. It is not publicly known which tools 
the Chinese authorities might have used but trade is obvious as is aid. Since 2009, China has 
used economic aid, creating the US$5bn investment fund for Greek shipowners, bought 
government bonds, and signed several trade and cooperation agreements. Also, China has 
employed Magnus’, Corre’s and Reilly’s soft power tools, including promotion of tourism and 
cultural exchange.  
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5.3. Piraeus and Rotterdam: security, political influence, economic or commercial 
Commercial ports used to be owned and controlled by central governments or local 
authorities as they were regarded as strategic assets or, at least, central to national 
economies. However, over the past 40-50 years many ports and port authorities have been 
fully or partially privatised, a process driven by ideology or economic necessity. Piraeus is an 
example of the latter. There are four reasons why investments in a foreign commercial port 
might be regarded as an asset: security, political, economic, or commercial, but to what extent 
do these apply to the Chinese investments in Piraeus and Rotterdam? 
 
Security 
The potential security or military aspects of BRI/MSRI have given rise to concerns, particularly 
the extent to which commercial ports might be used to support Chinese naval activities, not 
just as fully-fledged naval bases but also as providers of services. However, International Law 
and The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS), to which China and all the EU 
member states are parties, do not include general rights of innocent passage of foreign ships 
through internal waters nor access to ports but, if allowed entrance to a foreign port, a ship 
comes under the jurisdiction of the coastal state. Access by commercial ships is normally 
granted by bilateral or multilateral agreements but these do not cover war ships, which must 
seek so-called diplomatic clearance from the coastal state before entry (Aust, 2010, pp278-
280 & 296). Therefore, China’s navy does not automatically acquire special benefits from 
Chinese ownership and/or control of European ports. Port ownership or control per se is not 
a strategic geopolitical asset.  
 
Political 
State controlled FDI can potentially accord the investing state political leverage over the host 
country’s domestic and foreign policy, and academic papers as well as media interest have 
dealt with China’s political leverage in Europe: have Dalai Lama been welcomed, which 
countries have condemned China’s human rights records, which have promoted screening of 
FDI etc, and how has China responded?  
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In the case of the Netherlands there are no known instances of Chinese influence on domestic 
or foreign policy. Dalai Lama has visited eight times, meeting high level government ministers 
and officials, apart from his last visit in 2018, when he was guest of the Dutch church. The 
Dutch government has persistently and publicly criticised China’s human rights record, 
bilaterally and in international fora, without any noticeable repercussions, except once in 
1989, when China cancelled a visit from a high-level Dutch trade mission (ETNC, 2018, pp59-
62). Foreign investments are subjected to a national screening regime, which is in the process 
of being updated and extended, even if the Netherlands did not actively champion the recent 
EU Directive on screening.  
 
Greece, on the other hand, has no national screening regime and, together with several other 
member states, it raised concerns about the EU directive. Dalai Lama has never visited Greece 
but there are no indications that China has had any influence on this. However, in 2016 EU’s 
joint statement endorsing the South China Sea Arbitration Tribunal’s ruling was toned down 
at the insistence of Greece, Hungary and Croatia (ETNC,2016, p10). Furthermore, at the 
session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in June 2017 the EU, for the first time, 
did not make a common statement regarding human rights violations in certain countries, 
including China, due to objections from Greece. According to newspaper reports Greece 
blocked the EU statement as “unproductive criticism”, preferring to discuss human rights 
violations with China at private, bilateral meetings (NY Times, 2017). However, EU has 
subsequently referred to China’s human rights violations, latest in its statement at the Human 
Rights Council in March 2019. Finally, COSCO’s majority ownership and control of Piraeus 
could potentially complicate Greece’s ability to implement economic sanctions. A problem, 
particularly because COSCO is state-owned.   
 
Concerns about China’s potential leverage in EU and the member states are not unfounded 
but influence seems to vary, dependent on the circumstances of the individual country. While 
China seems to exert little, if any, political influence in the Netherlands, Greece is different. 
Using Blackwill’s and Harris’ analytical framework, it is perhaps not so much a question of 
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China’s superior “geoeconomic endowments” but rather Greece’s lack of “endowments”. 
However, as far as influence on EU’s external policy is concerned, China only needs political 
leverage in a single member state as foreign policy initiatives require unanimous approval. 
 
Economic 
One of the objectives of MSRI is to construct and/or own ports, thereby employing China’s 
surplus capacity, acquiring new technology and paving the way for increased trade and other 
infrastructure developments in the host country. Also, ownership contributes to trade 
security, as control of ports is part of the maritime value chain.  
 
Strategic ports are gateways to resource rich areas or dense consumer areas, they can be hub 
ports along shipping routes and chokepoints, or open new possibilities for alternative routes 
(Merk, 2017, p75). Rotterdam is a prime example of a strategic port, a gateway to important 
consumer areas and a transit hub, offering easy access to the most densely populated and 
industrialised areas in North-western Europe through a developed and well-functioning 
transport infrastructure, including feeder container companies, canals and railways. The 
reasons why Hutchison and COSCO have invested the port and China has chosen Rotterdam 
as terminal for one of its BRI rail corridors. Rotterdam does not offer direct opportunities for 
new developments and construction projects but it allows access to highly sophisticated port 
technology, particularly through Hutchison’s ownership of ECT. 
 
The economic reasons behind the Chinese investments in Piraeus are less obvious. Piraeus 
was not a strategic port in 2009, it was not on the main shipping route from China to Europe 
and it lacked a developed network of transport infrastructure in Greece and beyond. 
However, COSCO’s engagement in Piraeus is part of China’s plan to create a new “gateway to 
Europe”, an attempt to change the pattern of container shipping away from the traditional 
dominance of North-western European ports by opening a new, alternative route to Eastern 
and Central Europe, supported by major, new high-speed rail projects. Piraeus is now the 
third largest container port in the Mediterranean, and COSCO’s latest 2018 master 
investment plan reflects China’s MSRI strategy of building industrial parks, including economic 
and free trade zones, around Chinese controlled ports; Piraeus is the first example in Europe. 
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Furthermore, the development of Piraeus’ ferry and cruise business tie in with Beijing’s BRI 
strategy of developing people-to-people bonds and promoting Chinese culture and tourism 
in Europe. Therefore, COSCO’s investments in Piraeus are more likely to be dictated by China’s 
efforts to gain leverage in EU, taking advantage of Greece’s size, its place in the 
Mediterranean, its maritime traditions and, not least, its serious economic and political 
difficulties. 
 
Commercial 
Ownership of ports is regarded as an asset by both geopolitical and geoeconomic studies, 
Blackwill and Harris use the Port of Gwadar in Pakistan as an example. However, HPH’s and 
COSCO SPL’s investments in Rotterdam do not accord China any military advantages nor do 
they seem to create political leverage vis-à-vis the Netherlands. While there are sound 
economic reasons for Chinese interest in Rotterdam, the actual reasons for these investments 
might be commercial. Despite their unique relationships with Beijing, HPH and COSCO SPL are 
also commercial enterprises driven by the need to generate income and profit and their 
investments in Rotterdam are undoubtedly both profitable and advantageous. Not only does 
COSCO SPL gain priority in allocation of berths and port services, it also has some control as 
to access, cost and protection against sanctions. For HPH, Rotterdam is a natural fit in their 
global strategy.  
 
Piraeus is different, COSCO’s short to medium term commercial advantages are not obvious. 
COSCO SPL’s investments and its latest plans for major expansions do not seem to provide 
significant commercial gains as long as the onward transit network is not in place. It remains 
cheaper to use Rotterdam, despite the sailing time for containerships from China to Piraeus 
being nine days shorter and saving 25% of fuel cost. Onwards rail transport from Piraeus to 
Eastern and Central Europe, either through the Western Balkan or Bulgaria and Rumania, is 
slow, difficult and expensive; not all are members of EU, the networks are old and have 
different rail track gauges. Also, China’s plans for a high-speed railway between Athens, 
Beograd and Budapest with onwards connections in Central Europe were put on hold by the 
EU in 2017. Even with an improved rail network, using Piraeus as a transit hub is still not likely 
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to be cost effective, a large, modern containership carries more than 20,000 TEU and each 
train only 80-150 TEU. Transporting containers by rail, while faster, is substantially more 
expensive, with some estimates reckoning the cost per TEU by rail is between 2.5 and 5 times 
the cost by ship and others claiming it is only cost effective, if the value of the cargo is more 
than €85,000 per TEU (European Parliament, 2018, pp53 & 56).  
 
5.4. EU’s response to Chinese investments  
Contrary to BRI’s rail corridors, the potential implications of MSRI in EU, port investments in 
particular, have attracted limited interest beyond maritime transport circles. However, 
recently the EU and some member states, Germany and France in particular, have 
acknowledged the need to protect strategic assets, particularly critical technologies, 
infrastructure and sensitive information, while remaining open and welcoming to FDI. In 
February 2019 the EU approved a Directive setting out a framework for screening of FDI, 
encouraging the member states and the Commission to cooperate on protection against 
foreign investments, which might affect security and public interests, particularly state-
controlled FDI, but leaving the final approval to the individual members. So far only half of 
the member states, including the Netherlands, have national screening regimes, while nine, 
including Greece, have no plans to introduce these (MERICS, 2019, pp16-17). 
 
Also, in March 2019 the EU Commission issued a paper on “EU-China – A Strategic Outlook” 
drawing up an action plan for future cooperation with China, listing 10 recommendations for 
the European Council to endorse and pursue in the forthcoming negotiations with China 
about a comprehensive investment agreement. The paper refers to China as an “economic 
competitor” and “systemic rival” and recommends the EU “address the distortive effects of 
foreign state ownership and state financing”. Transport infrastructure is mentioned but not 
ports specifically (EU Commission, 2019). 
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5.5. BRI/MSRI in a theoretical framework 
Realist and geopolitical theories focus primarily on security and political influence analysing 
China’s recent ascent and the consequences for the relationship with the US. As argued in the 
Literature Review, these theories are therefore of limited value when analysing China’s 
BRI/MSRI investments in European ports. The military aspects of MSRI have caused much 
concern in relation to the South China Sea and less developed countries, however, 
investments in commercial ports do not per se give China’s navy access, this being an area 
regulated by International Law. Therefore, China’s potential political influence in Europe is 
not based on military but on economic might.     
 
Geoeconomics and economic statecraft provide a framework for analysing China’s BRI/MSRI 
strategy in Europe. China has openly applied several of Blackwill’s and Harris’ seven economic 
tools: investments, trade, aid and sovereign loans, among others, and their geoeconomic 
endowments do help to explain why Greece has been more susceptible to political influence 
than the Netherlands. The case study of Piraeus shows that particularly smaller countries with 
a weak political and economic environment are vulnerable, not only to China’s use of 
economic tools but also soft power tools as defined by Magnus, Corre and Reilly. Despite 
China presenting BRI/MSRI as an economic development, win-win strategy, the initiatives do 
help gaining political leverage and influence in some EU member states. 
 
However, Blackwill and Harris being Americans with experience from the State Department 
and various academic and foreign policy think tanks are focused on US foreign policy. “War 
by other Means” is a declared attempt to develop an American geoeconomic strategy, which 
can be used successfully in response to China’s and, to a lesser extent, Russia’s increasing use 
of economic tools. As this dissertation shows, Blackwill’s and Harris’ geoeconomic framework 
can be applied analysing China’s BRI/MSRI strategies but it does not comprehensively explain 
the Chinese activities in Europe. Their economic tools and geoeconomic endowments are 
essentially instruments available to and used by a liberal, democratic state and do not, for 
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example, take into account state and non-state actors, commercial enterprises and domestic, 
regional authorities, which may or may not be acting under direct instructions from the 
central government. A particular problem in relation to this dissertation has been to 
determine if and when Chinese companies, state-owned or private, mainland Chinese or Hong 
Kong based, are acting on Beijing’s instructions or dictated by their own commercial interests.                
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6. Conclusion 
 
China’s BRI/MSRI strategy is the subject of extensive debates in academic, political and media 
circles, questioning the officially stated motives: economic, win-win projects aimed at 
promoting connectivity and regional development in China’s western provinces, addressing 
domestic industrial overcapacity and capital surpluses, opening access to resources and new 
markets, integrating the Renminbi in the international financial system, as well as promoting 
maritime cooperation and connectivity. Instead the West and, increasingly, China’s 
neighbours have focused on what they see as China’s geopolitical powerplay, its attempts to 
create a new world order, a debt trap and cultural influence.  
 
This dissertation has focused on MSRI, asking three interrelated questions with a view to 
explain why China is investing in European commercial ports, is it motivated by security issues, 
attempts to gain political influence or economic, above all, commercial considerations, and 
do the answers have implications for the EU’s and the member states’ response?     
 
Based on Blackwill’s and Harris’ geoeconomic analytical framework and soft powers as 
suggested by other proponents of economic statecraft, the analysis of the two case studies 
of Chinese investments in Piraeus and Rotterdam shows that there is no single answer and 
the objectives vary between the two host countries and ports. None of the investments are 
determined by security/military issues and Hutchison’s and COSCO’s investments in 
Rotterdam do not show signs of an attempt by China to gain political leverage in the 
Netherlands. Instead, these investments are reflecting the two investors’ commercial 
interests and wider Chinese economic considerations. On the other hand, COSCO’s 
investments in Piraeus are not primarily determined by commercial considerations but by 
China’s stated objectives to convert the port and, by implication, Greece, into its “gateway to 
Europe” as well as redirecting some container shipping routes away from North-western 
Europa towards the Mediterranean, i.e. political leverage and economic considerations. 
China’s broad objectives in Greece are mirrored in its use of a wide spectrum of economic 
and soft power tools: investments, trade, economic aid as well as promotion of Chinese 
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tourism and culture. Ultimately, Piraeus and Rotterdam are strategically very different and 
the host countries equally so, politically, economically and geographically, rendering China’s 
geoeconomic endowments more “valuable” in Greece than in the Netherlands. 
The EU and China signed a strategic partnership agreement in 2003 but despite numerous 
high-level meetings and initiatives as well as flourishing trade and investments, the BRI/MSRI 
cooperation remain bilateral, between China and the individual member states. Only this year 
has EU agreed a framework for screening of FDI and started negotiations with China about a 
comprehensive investment regime, a reflection of the member states’ various needs for new 
FDI and lack of agreement about how to deal with China’s growing economic and political 
influence in Europe. Keeping in mind these differences and the fact that China’s BRI/MSRI 
strategy varies from member state to member state a mutually agreed EU policy is unlikely, 
at least until China’s varied objectives and tools are fully understood and acknowledged.  
 
A limited sample of two case studies does not provide comprehensive answers to the 
questions as to why China invests in commercial ports in Europe and what drives these 
investments. However, this dissertation does show that China’s BRI/MSRI strategy is not 
dictated by security, military issues nor solely a political powerplay, as assumed by realist and 
geopolitical theorists. Instead the geoeconomic analytical framework provides tools to 
explain how China uses its economic might in pursuit of its BRI/MSRI and foreign policy 
strategy. However, the framework does not take into account the fundamental differences 
between the economic and commercial reasons for the Chinese investments in European 
commercial ports, nor does it distinguish between investments initiated or controlled by 
Beijing and those made by Chinese companies, possibly for purely commercial reasons.  
 
Further research into the variety of reasons for Chinese investments in Europe is needed to 
understand China’s BRI/MSRI strategy and for EU and the member states to develop 
comprehensive and effective responses. It is necessary to include political, economic and 
commercial variables, actors and dynamics at several levels as well as state-owned and 
private companies in mainland China and Hong Kong. A possibly way forward might be 
research based on the so-called Bureaucratic Political Model (BPM), using organisation theory 
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and bureaucratic politics, as developed by Graham Allison et al. In the words of Stephen Walt, 
BPM does “not seek to provide a general theory of international behaviour but to identify 
other factors that might lead states to behave contrary to the predictions” of the major 
theories (Walt, 1998, p34).  
 
  
 48 
 
Bibliography 
 
AIPH, International Association of Ports and Harbours, World Container Traffic Data 2018”, 
https://www.iaphworldports.org/statistics, accessed 27-03-2019 
Allison, Graham (2015) “The Thucydides Trap: Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?”, The 
Atlantic, 24 September, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-
states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756 
Aust, Anthony (2010) Handbook of International Law, 2nd edition, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 
Aust, Anthony (2013) Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 3rd edition, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press 
Baldwin, David A (2016) “Economic Statecraft” in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
http://www.britannica.com/topic/economic-statecraft, accessed 25-01-2019   
Blackwill, Robert D. & Jennifer Harris (2017) War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft, 
Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press 
Blanchard, Jean-Marc F. (2017) “Probing China’s Twenty-First-Century Maritime Silk Road 
Initiative (MSRI): An Examination of MSRI Narratives”, Geopolitics, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 246-
268 
Blanchard, Jean-Marc F. & Colin Flint (2017) “The Geopolitics of China’s Maritime Silk Road 
Initiative”, Geopolitics, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 223-245 
Britannica, Encyclopaedia, Li Ka-shing, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Li-Ka-shing, 
accessed 18-03-2019    
Clingendael Institute (2014) Chinese Investment in the Port of Piraeus, Greece: The Relevance for 
the EU and the Netherlands, February, the Hague 
https://www.clingendael.org/publications/chinese-investment-port-piraeus, accessed 01-
03-2019 
Corre, Philippe le (2018) China’s Rise as Geoeconomic Influencer: Four European Case Studies, 
Working Paper, October, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/15/china-s-rise-as-geoeconomic-influencer-four-
european-case-studies-pub-77462, accessed 08-11-2018 
COSCO SPL, COSCO Shipping Ports Limited, https://ports.coscoshipping.com/en/AboutCSP, 
accessed 19-03-2019 
COSCO, China COSCO Shipping Corporation Limited, http://en.cosco.com/col/col771, accessed 
07-03-2019 
Danish Shipping, Facts and Figures, 2017 and 2018, Danske Rederier, Copenhagen, Denmark, 
https://www.danishshipping.dk/en/publikationer/publikationer-om-skibsfart, accessed 06-
03-2019 
Deudney, Daniel H. (2018) “Geopolitics” in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/geopolitics, accessed 20-03-2019  
 49 
 
Drewry Maritime Research (2017) Ports & Terminals Insight: Quarterly Analysis of the Port and 
Terminals Market, Quarter 3, London  
ECT, European Container Terminals, https://www.ect.nl/en, accessed 16-03-2019 
Ekathimerini (2019) “Athens torpedoes Cosco plans in Piraeus”, 10 April, 
http://www.ekathimerini.com/239207/article/ekathimerini/business/athens-torpedoes-
cosco-plans-in-piraeus?utm_source=Silk+Road+Headlines&utm_campaign=fb9da10aa8-
EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_04_10_08_58&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_70119be3b7-
fb9da10aa8-79998501, accessed 01-05-2019   
ETNC Report 2015, “Mapping Europe-China Relations: A Bottom-UP Approach”, The European 
Think-tank Network on China, October, 
https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/etnc_web_final_1-1.pdf, accessed 06-
12-2018 
ETNC Report 2016, “Europe and China’s New Silk Road, The European Think-tank Network on 
China, December, https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/ouvrages-de-lifri/europe-and-
chinas-new-silk-roads, accessed 06-12-2018 
ETNC Report 2017, “Chinese Investment in Europe: A Country-Level Approach”, The European 
Think-tank Network on Europe, December, 
https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/etnc_reports_2017_final_20dec2017, 
accessed 06-12-2018 
ETNC Report 2018, “Political Values in European-China Relations”, The European Think-tank 
Network on Europe, December, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/full-
report-web-version_updated_2019.pdf, accessed 06-12-2018 
European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
(2019) Joint Communication To The European Parliament, The European Council and The 
Council, “EU-China – A Strategic Outlook”, Strasbourg, 12 March, 
https://ec.europe.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/communication-eu-china-
strategic-outlook.pdf, accessed 04-04-2019 
European Parliament (2018) “Research for TRAN Committee: The New Silk Route – 
opportunities and challenges for EU transport”, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_STU(2018)5
85907, accessed 03-03-2019 
Ferdinand, Peter (2016) “Westward ho – the China Dream and “one belt, one road”: Chinese 
foreign policy under Xi Jinping”, International Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 4, pp. 941-957  
Financial Times (2018) Lunch with the FT Henry Kissinger, 21-22 July 
FT Investigation (2017) “How China Rules the Waves”, 12 January, Financial Times, 
https://ig.ft.com/sites/china-ports, accessed 05-03-2019 
FT Lexicon, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=foreign-direct-investment, accessed 03-03-2019 
HPH, Hutchison Port Holdings, http://www.hph.com.hk, accessed 16-03-2019 
 50 
 
Hughes, Christopher (2011) “Reclassifying Chinese Nationalism: the geopolitik turn”, Journal of 
Contemporary China, 20(71), September, pp. 601-620  
Hutchison, CK Hutchison Holdings, www.ckh.com.hk, accessed 20-03-2019   
IIER (2017), Greek Institute of International Economic Relations, “Chinese Investment in Greece 
and the Big Picture of Sino-Greek Relations”, December, http://idos.gr/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/Chinese-Investment-in-Greece_4-12-2017, accessed 03-03-2019   
IMF, Balance of Payments Division IMF Statistics Department 
https://www.imf.org/external/region/tlm/rr/pdf/Jan11.pdf, accessed 03-03-2019 
ISPI (2015) “Xi’s Policy Gambles: The Bumpy Road Ahead”, 
https://www.ispionline.it/pubblicazione/xis-policy-gambles-bumpy-road-ahead-12911, 
accessed 26-02-2019 
Kang, David C. & Xinru Ma (2018) “Power Transitions: Thucydides Didn’t Live in East Asia”, 
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 4, Νο. 1, pp. 137-154  
Kaplan, Robert D. (2009) “The Revenge of Geography”, Foreign Policy, No. 172 (May/June), pp. 
96-105 
_____ (2010) “The Geography of Chinese Power, How Far Can Beijing Reach on Land and at 
Sea”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 3, pp. 22-41  
_____ (2018) The Return of Marco Polo’s World: War, Strategy, and American Interests in the 
Twenty-First Century, New York, Random House 
Kissinger, Henry (2012) On China, New York, Penguin 
Liu Wei (2018) “The Belt and Road Initiative: A Bellwether of China’s Role in Global 
Governance”, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center For Global Policy, 
https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/09/10/belt-and-road-initiative-bellweather-of-china-s-
role-in-global-governance-pub-77204, accessed 17-09-2018  
Luttwak, Edward (1990) “From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of 
Commerce”, The National Interest, Summer, pp. 17-23  
_____ (2011) “Why China Will Not Become the Next Global Power … But It Could”, Infinity 
Journal, Issue 4, Fall, pp. 8-11, https://odonnellf.files.wordpress.com/2015/10/luttwak-why-
china-will-not-become-the-next-global-power-2012.pdf 
Mackinder, Halford (1904) “The Geographical Pivot of History”, Geographical Journal, Vol. 23, 
No. 4, April, pp. 421-37 
Magnus, George (2018) Red Flags: Why Xi’s China is in Jeopardy, New Haven, CT, Yale University 
Press 
Mahan, Alfred Thayer (1890) The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. 
Mandelbaum, Michael (2016) Mission Failure, America and the World in the Post-Cold War Era, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press 
Marine Link (2017), 12 June, https://www.marinelinks.com/news/shanghai-piraeus-
signs426313, accessed 11-03-2019 
 51 
 
Mearsheimer, John J. (2014) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Updated ed., New York, W. W. 
Norton & Co 
Menon Economics & DNV-GP (2018), “The Leading Maritime Nations of the World 2018”, 
September, https://menon.no/wp-content/uplods/2018-84-LMN-2018.pdf, accessed 08-03-
2019 
MERICS, Mercator Institute for China Studies (2019), “Chinese FDI in Europe: 2018 Trends and 
Impact of New Screening Policies”, March, https://www.merics.org/en/papers-on-
china/chinese-fdi-in-europe-2018, accessed 06-03-2019 
_____ (2018), “EU-China FDI: Working Towards Reciprocity in Investment Relations”, No 3, 
Update, May, https://www.merics.org/sites/default/files/2018-08/180723_MERICS-COFDI-
Update_final.pdf, accessed 28-02-2019 
Merk, Olaf (2017) “Geopolitics and Commercial Seaports”, Revue Internationale et Strategique, 
No. 107, pp. 73-83 
New York Times (2017) “In Greece, China Finds an Ally Against Human Rights Criticism”, 19 June, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/19/world/europe/china-human-rights-greece-united-
nations.html, accessed 13-02-2019 
Nordea Bank Abp, https://www.nordeatrade.com/en/explore-new-
market/netherlands/investment, accessed 16-03-2019 
OECD Statistics, Globalisation, FDI Statistics, 
https://stats.oecd.org/?lang=en&SubSessionId=f7cea22f-8db5-413c-81cc-
f4fc1c1e4a4c&themetreeid=-200#, accessed 17-03-2019 
PortEconomics, “Details of a port privatisation: Thessaloniki port”, 17-04-2018, 
http://www.porteconomics.eu/2018/04/17/details-of-a-port-privatisation-thessaloniki-
port/, accessed 12-03-2019 
Reilly, James (2013) “China’s Economic Statecraft: Turning Wealth into Power”, Lowy Institute 
for International Policy, November, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/chinas-
economic-statecraft-turning-wealth-power, accessed 20-11-2018 
_____ (2017) “China’s economic statecraft in Europe”, 27 March 2017, Asia Europe Journal, Vol. 
15, Issue 2, pp. 173-185  
Richardson, Paul (2015) ““Blue national soil” and the unwelcome return of “classical” 
geopolitics”, Global Change, Peace & Security, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 229-236 
Seatrade Maritime (2018a) “COSCO Reveals $620mio Piraeus Development Plan”, 29 January, 
http://www.seatrade-maritime.com/news/europe/cosco-reveals-620m-piraeus-
development-plan.html, accessed 12-03-2019 
_____ (2018b), “Cosco Shipping’s Piraeus plans dealt a blow”, 3 December, 
http://www.seatrade-maritime.com/news/europe/cosco-shipping-s-piraeus-plans-dealt-a-
blow.html, accessed 04-12-2018 
The Diplomat (2016) “China’s Mediterranean Odyssey”, 19 April, 
https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/chinas-mediterranean-odyssey, accessed 01-02-2018 
 52 
 
TNH The National Herald (2019) “After Piraeus Project Blocked, Greek Foreign Minister Visits 
China”, Clingendael Newsletter, 7 March, https://www.clingendael.org/publication/silk-
road-headlines-archive, accessed 07-03-2019 
Trade EU-China, 
https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/country/details_china_en.pdf, 
accessed 01-03-2019 
UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2018, 
https://unctad.org/en/publicationslibrary/tdstat43_en.pdf, accessed 03-03-2019 
UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport, 2018, United Nations, www.un.org/publications, 
accessed 03-03-2019  
Varoufakis, Yanis (2017) Adults in the Room: My Battle with Europe’s Deep Establishment, 
Penguin Random House. 
Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, 
28-03-2015, issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, 
https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330 669367.html, accessed 11-02-2019 
Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative, 20-06-2017, 
http://www.china.org.cn/world/2017-06/20/content_41063286.htm, accessed 11-10-2018  
Walt, Stephen M. (2018) “International Relations: One World, Many Theories”, Foreign Policy, 
No 110, Spring, pp. 29-46  
World Bank WITS, World Integrated Trade Solution, 
https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/NLD/Year/LTST/TradeFlow/EXPIMP/
Partner/by-country, accessed 27-03-2019  
World Maritime News (2016) “Cosco Pacific Buys Stake in Euromax Terminal in Rotterdam”, 12 
May, https://worldmaritimenews.com/archives/191588/cosco-pacific-buys-stake-in-
euromax-terminal-in-rotterdam/, accessed 21-02-2019 
Xi Jinping (2016) Keynote Speech at G20 Summit, 3 September, 
https://www.g20chn.org/english/dynamic/201609/t20160909 3414.html, accessed 11-02-
2019 
Zhang, Wenmu (2006) “Sea Power and China’s Strategic Choices”, China Security, Summer, pp. 
17-31, https://core.ac.uk/reader/71339243, accessed 04-01-2019. 
